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Abstract
We are interested in the occurrence of expectation-driven fluctuations
of a rational bubble and the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy. Our
explanation of fluctuations is based on credit market imperfections. For
this purpose, we consider an overlapping generations exchange economy
where households realize a portfolio choice between money and bubble.
Money is held because of a partial cash-in-advance constraint affected by
the bubble. Bubble acts as a store of value, but also as a collateral. Indeed,
a higher value of the bubble implies a higher amount of collateral, which,
in turn, reduces the need of cash, and thus increases consumption pur-
chased on credit. Under these credit market features, expectation-driven
fluctuations and the multiplicity of steady-states occur, in particular for
arbitrarily small market distortions. Investing the stabilizing role of mo-
netary policy, we show that when the monetary policy rule depends on
expected inflation only, a more active rule stabilizes only if collateral has
a large effect on consumption financed on credit. Finally, we enrich this
rule by including asset prices. A policy which depends on asset prices
can stabilize whatever the effect of collateral and can also rule out the
multiplicity of steady states. More generally, this paper emphasizes the
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key role of consumers’ credit market imperfections to explain bubble fluc-
tuations and exhibits the stabilizing power of monetary rules including
asset prices.
JEL classification: D91, E32, E52.
Keywords: Rational bubble; Cash-in-advance constraint; Collateral; Endoge-
nous fluctuations; Monetary policy.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, financial markets have frequently gone through periods
of excessive asset price volatility. Some empirical studies, Shiller (1981, 1989,
2000), LeRoy and Porter (1981), and more recently Campbell (2003), highlight
this excess volatility and reveal that asset prices tend to fluctuate more than
their fundamentals. These contributions reflect the idea that the excess volatility
could come from fluctuations of a bubble.
In the collective consciousness, and many political debates, the fluctuations
of a bubble are often associated to the irrational behavior of agents. In 1996,
Alan Greenspan uses the expression “irrational exuberance” to describe the
movements of speculative bubbles in financial markets.1 In this paper, we pro-
vide an alternative justification of such fluctuations, which lies in the volatility
of rational expectations, i.e. in the existence of persistent expectation-driven
fluctuations of a rational bubble.
In addition, asset prices are in the heart of another debate, namely whether
central banks should take or not into account asset price movements in monetary
policy. As for academic research, the debate is not resolved: among others,
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007) and Gali (2011) provide a negative answer about including asset prices in
monetary rules, whereas Nutahara (2010) and Singh and Stone (2011) develop
models in favor of it. Interestingly, these two last papers take into account credit
market frictions. Moreover, several Governors of central bank or practitioners of
monetary policy recently encourage more research on these topics. In his recent
speech, Bernanke (2011) argues that: “In my view, the issue is not whether
central bankers should ignore possible financial imbalances –they should not–
but, rather, what “the right tool for the job” is to respond to such imbalances.”
In our framework, we also contribute to this debate. A monetary policy, which
responds to movements in asset prices, stabilizes economic fluctuations with the
existence of a rational bubble, whereas this is not always the case when the rule
depends on inflation forecasts only.
We build a simple general equilibrium model in which rational bubbles
could experience persistent fluctuations, and also allowing us to study the
(de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy. Our explanation is mainly based on
credit market imperfections, the role of the bubble as a collateral, and a port-
folio choice between two assets, money and a bubble. In contrast to recent con-
1This expression is also taken up by Robert Shiller (2000) as the title of his book.
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tributions studying the link between rational bubbles and credit market imper-
fections faced by entrepreneurs (Farhi and Tirole (2010), Kocherlakota (2009)),
but more in line with Kocherlakota (1992) or Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009),
we focus on consumers’ credit constraints.2 We introduce such constraints in a
monetary overlapping generations (OLG) model. Referring to Tirole’s seminal
papers (1982, 1985), the OLG model provides a simple and useful framework to
deal with the existence of rational bubbles.3
The issue of fluctuations of a rational bubble within an OLG model has been
addressed only in few contributions (Grandmont (1985), Weil (1987), Michel and
Wigniolle (2003, 2005), Bosi and Seegmuller (2010) and Wigniolle (2012)). Our
aim is to provide an additional explanation of expectation-driven fluctuations of
a bubble based on credit market imperfections, and to study the (de-)stabilizing
role of monetary rules responding to inflation forecasts and asset prices.4
We consider an exchange economy in which households realize a portfolio
choice between an asset without fundamental value (the bubble) and money
needed for transactions. More precisely, money is held because of a binding
cash-in-advance constraint on the second-period consumption purchases.5 A
share of second-period consumption is paid in cash with monetary savings, while
the remaining share is purchased on credit by borrowing against non-monetary
savings. In our model, the cash-in-advance constraint reflects credit market
imperfections.
One important feature is that the share of consumption purchased on credit
depends positively on the value of the bubble. The bubble serves as a collateral,
i.e. a credit guarantee for households. If households hold more savings in the
form of bubble, the amount of collateral increases, which allows households to
increase their opportunity to obtain credits, and thus their share of consumption
purchased on credit. This assumption also means that distortions in credit
market are decreasing in collateral. Since we focus on a binding cash-in-advance
constraint, the portfolio choice is endogenously determined and variable over
time depending on expectations about future asset prices.
Our main results lean on credit market features. Whatever the level of credit
market imperfections, expectation-driven fluctuations and two-period cycles oc-
cur under large income effects, i.e. when savings are an increasing function of ex-
pected inflation. This result is closely related to Grandmont (1985, 1986). More
2Some empirical studies highlight finance constraints at the household level. See for ins-
tance Campbell and Mankiw (1989).
3However, the existence of rational bubbles could also be provided in infinitely-lived house-
hold models. For instance, Kocherlakota (1992) develops a model with heterogeneous agents
and borrowing constraints, and Kamihigashi (2008) an economy with wealth in the utility
function.
4Hence, even if we do not consider capital accumulation, we generalize the analysis provided
in Bosi and Seegmuller (2010) in two directions. First, we provide a more deeply analysis of
dynamics, and second, we consider monetary policies not only characterized by a constant
growth rate.
5See Hahn and Solow (1995). For further details about cash-in-advance constraints in a
OLG model, the reader can refer to Crettez et al. (1999). In addition, in contrast to Michel
and Wigniolle (2003, 2005), we focus on equilibria for which the cash-in-advance constraint is
always binding. As a consequence, bubbles on real money balances cannot exist.
3
interestingly, a rational bubble also experiences fluctuations due to the volatil-
ity of expectations under slightly restrictive conditions, i.e. for arbitrarily small
credit market imperfections and for relatively small income effects. This result
answers a recurrent criticism about endogenous fluctuations in monetary OLG
models. The intuition is the following. As collateral matters, a change in the
portfolio structure takes place. A rise in expected inflation generates a portfolio
effect: households reallocate savings from monetary to non-monetary savings,
i.e. increase the share of the bubble in total savings. The amount of collateral
increases. As a consequence, households consume less by cash in the second
period of life. The return on money decreases. An effective rise in inflation
takes place, and expectations are self-fulfilling. In connection with this result,
we show that the multiplicity of steady states occurs under the same conditions:
convergence or not to a steady state may depend on agents’ expectations.
We pursue by analyzing the stabilizing role of monetary policy on the fluc-
tuations of the rational bubble. The question of whether monetary policy can
stabilize endogenous fluctuations has been essentially studied in models with-
out portfolio choice and without collateral (Grandmont (1985, 1986), Sorger
(2005)). While Grandmont (1985, 1986) suggests monetary policies coordi-
nating expectations, Sorger (2005) studies monetary rules based on inflation
forecast targeting,6 which alter conditions for local indeterminacy. He shows
that an active rule, i.e. a monetary rule which strongly reacts to expected in-
flation,7 destabilizes by increasing the range of parameter values for which local
indeterminacy occurs. We get the same conclusions for small collateral effects.
However, we show that the presence of collateral can reverse this established
result: an active inflation forecast targeting rule locally stabilizes fluctuations
occurring for large income effects as soon as the effect of collateral on the share
of consumption purchased on credit is large enough. However, inflation forecast
targeting has no impact on fluctuations, which occur for small income effects,
and does not modify conditions under which the multiplicity of steady states
may occur. Such a rule locally stabilizes, but not globally.
We further examine whether a monetary rule, responding to movements in
asset prices, is appropriate to stabilize an economy, which experiences persistent
fluctuations of a bubble. We extend the rule of inflation targeting proposed by
Sorger (2005) by including asset prices. A monetary rule with asset prices could
locally and globally stabilize fluctuations unlike a monetary rule which responds
only to inflation. More precisely, when collateral has a small effect on the share
of consumption purchased on credit, a passive monetary rule is stabilizing, and
when collateral sufficiently matters, an active one is stabilizing. Following the
debate initiated by Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and recently advanced
by several Governors of central bank or practitioners of monetary policy (Yellen
(2009), Bernanke (2010, 2011)), a monetary policy including asset prices is
powerful to rule out expectation-driven fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Section 2 is devoted to the
6Note that in a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) explains, however, that the US monetary
policy follows more closely such a rule than one based on observed inflation.
7Following Sorger (2005), we adopt the terminology initiated by Benhabib et al. (2001).
4
presentation of the model. In Section 3, the intertemporal equilibrium is defined.
Steady states with a bubble are studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we show the
existence of bubble fluctuations. Section 6 discusses the (de-)stabilizing role of
monetary policies. A last section provides concluding remarks, whereas some
technical details are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
We focus on an OLG exchange economy with identical two period-lived house-
holds, discrete time (t = 0, 1, ...,+∞) and three goods: a final good, money and
an asset paper.
2.1 Households
There is no population growth and, at each date t, a generation of unit size is
born. Each generation lives two periods.
In her first period of life, a household is endowed with e ≥ 0 units of con-
sumption good and receives a monetary transfer Tt from the monetary authority
that she allocates between the purchase of the consumption good ct at price pt
and savings in the form of nominal balances Mt+1 and an asset paper with-
out fundamental value, which corresponds to non-monetary savings. Let Bt
be the nominal value of non-monetary savings and 1 + it+1 the return factor
between t and t + 1. In her second period of life, since the household has nei-
ther endowments nor a monetary transfer, she uses her remunerated savings
Mt+1 + (1 + it+1)Bt to consume dt+1 at price pt+1.
The preferences of a household are represented by an additively separable
life-cycle utility function:
u (ct) + βv (dt+1) (1)
where β > 0, and ct and dt+1 respectively denote the consumption of final good
in the first and second period of life.
Assumption 1 u (c) and v (d) are continuous functions defined on [0,+∞),
C2 on (0,+∞), strictly increasing (u′ > 0, v′ > 0) and concave (u′′ < 0, v′′ < 0).
Moreover, limc→0 u′ (c) = +∞ and limd→0 v′ (d) = +∞. We define εu (c) ≡
−cu′′(c)u′(c) and εv (d) ≡ −d v
′′(d)
v′(d) as the degrees of concavity of u (c) and v (d)
respectively.
Under perfect foresight, the representative household of a generation born
at time t derives consumption plan and savings (money and asset paper) by
maximizing the utility function (1) under the first and second-period budget
constraints:
ptct +Mt+1 +Bt ≤ pte+ Tt (2)
pt+1dt+1 ≤ Mt+1 + (1 + it+1)Bt (3)
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Furthermore, in the second period of life, each household faces a cash-in-advance
constraint. We use the constraint introduced by Hahn and Solow (1995), i.e.
γpt+1dt+1 ≤Mt+1, but affected by the presence of collateral.
γ (bt) pt+1dt+1 ≤ Mt+1 (4)
where bt ≡ Bt/pt is the real amount of non-monetary savings.
A binding cash-in-advance constraint means that households finance a share
γ (bt) ∈ (0, 1) of second-period consumption by cash with monetary savings.
The remaining share 1 − γ (bt) is financed by borrowing against the resale of
non-monetary savings, i.e. the asset paper sold in the financial markets at the
end of the second period valued at (1 + it+1)Bt. In other words, 1 − γ(bt)
represents the share of consumption purchased on credit. For further reference,
we refer to 1− γ (bt) as the credit share.8
In addition, we assume that the credit share depends positively on the
amount of non-monetary savings for two reasons: the velocity of money and
the credit market frictions. First, we give an answer to a recurrent criticism
addressed to the cash-in-advance literature: money velocity 1/γ (bt) is endoge-
nous and no longer constant. Second, through this assumption, we capture some
unmodeled financial frictions in borrower-lender relationship as asymmetric in-
formation or financial regulation policy. This is a simple manner to introduce
credit market imperfections including a collateral effect in our framework. Real
non-monetary savings (asset paper) act as a collateral: if households hold more
savings in the form of asset paper,9 the amount of collateral increases, which
allows households to increase their opportunity to obtain credits, and thus to
reduce their need of cash in their second period of life.10
Assumption 2 γ (b) ∈ (0, 1) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞), C2
on (0,+∞), decreasing (γ′ (b) ≤ 0) and such that γ (0) < 1 −  , where  is
sufficiently close to zero. In addition, we define:
η1 (b) ≡ [1− γ (b)]
′
b
1− γ (b) ≥ 0, η2 (b) ≡ −
[1− γ (b)]′′ b
[1− γ (b)]′ (5)
ηη (b) ≡ η
′
1 (b) b
η1 (b)
= 1− η1 (b)− η2 (b) (6)
As an example, the following function satisfies these properties:
γ(b) =
A
s
exp(−sb), (7)
8A similar idea can be seen in Lucas and Stokey (1987), where consumption purchased
with money would correspond to “cash goods”and consumption purchased on credit to “credit
goods”.
9Take in mind that the present value of a bubble asset embodies future values.
10Since bt depicts the real amount of non-monetary savings of an household (e.g. the
household estate), bt instead of bt+1 represents a collateral.
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with 0 < A < s(1− ). From this function given by Eq. (7), we can derive η1(b)
and η2(b) such that:
η1(b) =
A exp(−sb)
1− As exp(−sb)
b ≥ 0 and η2(b) = sb > 0
Notice that when collateral plays no role (η1 (b) = 0), and γ tends to 0,
money is no longer needed and the credit market distortions disappear. When
collateral matters (η1 (b) > 0), the household is aware of the credit share func-
tion, 1− γ(bt), so that she takes into account its argument bt in her decisions.
Using pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt and introducing the real variables mt ≡ Mt/pt and
τt ≡ Tt/pt, the constraints (2)-(4) can be rewritten:
ct + pit+1mt+1 + bt ≤ e+ τt (8)
dt+1 ≤ mt+1 + 1 + it+1
pit+1
bt (9)
γ (bt) dt+1 ≤ mt+1 (10)
The representative household maximizes (1) under the budget and cash-in-
advance constraints (8)-(10) to determine optimal consumption plan (ct, dt+1)
and optimal real savings (mt+1, bt). All constraints are binding if money is a
dominated asset ((1 + it+1) /pit+1 > 1/pit+1), or equivalently the opportunity
cost of holding money, the nominal interest rate it+1, is strictly positive (it+1 >
0). Only a bubble on the asset paper could appear.
In the remaining of the paper, we only consider the case of a binding cash-in-
advance constraint so that the portfolio choice is determined. The asset paper
holdings, whose the level depends on expectations about its future value, deter-
mine the money demand used for future consumption. Nonetheless, because of
the endogeneity of the credit share, the portfolio choice is no longer constant.
The trade-off between assets becomes endogenous and depends on the amount
of collateral held by the household implying the existence of a “portfolio effect”.
This portfolio effect could be seen as a substitution effect within the portfolio
following a change in the relative price between the two assets. Thereafter, we
will see that this portfolio effect is a key mechanism through which expectation-
driven fluctuations emerge.
Assumption 3 For all t ≥ 0, we assume it > 0 and
η1 (bt) <
γ (bt)
1− γ (bt)
bt
pit+1mt+1
(11)
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 3, constraints (8)-(10) are binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The inequality (11) puts an upper bound to the credit-share elasticity η1 (b).
It is specific to our model because of the presence of collateral. Since the right-
hand side is strictly positive, the inequality (11) is satisfied when the credit
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share, 1− γ, is constant (η1 = 0). Thereafter, we focus on the case where η1 is
not too large. In other words, we consider small distortions in the credit market.
Under Assumption 3, the optimal households’ behavior is summarized by
the following equation:
u′ (ct)
βv′ (dt+1)
=
1
pit+1
(1 + it+1) /pit+1 + γ′ (bt) dt+1
[1− γ (bt)] [1/pit+1 + γ′ (bt) dt+1] + γ (bt) [(1 + it+1) /pit+1 + γ′ (bt) dt+1]
>
1
pit+1
(12)
where the last inequality holds because money is a dominated asset (1/pit+1 <
(1 + it+1) /pit+1 ). Furthermore, we deduce the following lemma
11:
Lemma 2 Let
ε˜u ≡ c (1− γ)
2
/b
[1− γ + (1 + i) (γ − η1)]2
iη1
(
2− η2
1− η1
)
The second-order conditions are satisfied if εu > ε˜u.
Proof. See Appendix.
We further note that under a constant credit share (1− γ (b) = 1− γ), Eq.
(12) rewrites:
u′ (ct)
βv′ (dt+1)
=
1 + it+1
pit+1
1
1 + it+1γ
(13)
When γ tends to 0, the right-hand side would reduce to (1 + it+1) /pit+1, which
is similar to the trade-off found in the monetary model by Samuelson (1958).
There are no market distortions. When γ > 0, money demand implies an
opportunity cost which lowers the real return on portfolio. More precisely, the
household has to pay by cash a share γ to consume an extra-unit when she is
old. The interest rate it+1 entails an opportunity cost γit+1 which reduces the
purchasing power of savings in the form of asset paper. Furthermore, when the
credit share depends on collateral, the marginal effect of non-monetary savings
on the credit share (−γ′ (b) > 0) becomes an additional distortion.
2.2 Monetary rule
Let us introduce the money growth factor µt = Mt+1/Mt. It can be rewritten:
µt = pit+1
mt+1
mt
(14)
As in Sorger (2005), the money growth factor corresponds to the monetary
instrument.12 However, focusing on bubble fluctuations, we extend the rule
11For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
12In recent work, Gaballo (2012) introduces a monetary rule, whose the monetary instru-
ment is the money supply, to study the social value of information about the future in a OLG
model of inflation.
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proposed by Sorger (2005), by taking deviations of observed asset prices from
the target into account. Although the instrument of the rule is the money
growth factor, our formulation corresponds to the one suggested by Bernanke
and Gertler (1999, 2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) and Singh and Stone
(2010).
The monetary policy is implemented trough an instrument rule of the fol-
lowing form:
µt = µ
∗
(
pit+1
µ∗
)−α(
bt
b∗
)−ρ
, (15)
with α ∈ (−1,+∞) and ρ ∈ (−1,+∞).
We clarify that µ∗ and b∗ are respectively the stationary values of the money
growth factor and the asset price level of an existing stationary equilibrium
chosen as the targets by the monetary authority.
When α = 0 and ρ = 0, the nominal money supply grows at the constant
growth factor µt = µ
∗. This policy corresponds to a regime of strict money
growth targeting in which the nominal money growth rate is fixed at its sta-
tionary value µ∗.
When α 6= 0 and ρ = 0, Eq. (15) depicts a policy rule for inflation forecast
targeting (Sorger (2005)). When the monetary authority sets the money growth
factor µt, the inflation pit+1 has not been observed yet and can be seen as an
inflation forecast. For α > 0, the nominal money growth is a decreasing function
of expected inflation. The nominal money growth is contracted if expected
inflation is above its stationary value µ∗ and expanded if expected inflation is
below. For α ∈ (−1, 0), the nominal money growth is an increasing function
of expected inflation but less than proportional. As Benhabib et al. (2001)
and Sorger (2005), we call a rule with α > 0 an active one and a rule with
α ∈ (−1, 0) a passive one.
When α 6= 0 and ρ 6= 0, Eq. (15) depicts a monetary rule which takes into
account the level of asset prices. This rule includes a response to the level of
current asset prices bt with respect to its steady state level b
∗.
This rule is in accordance with Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001). In addi-
tion, several Governors of central bank or practitioners of monetary policy en-
courage more research on monetary policies which would react to credit booms
(Yellen (2009)). By considering bt as savings in the form of credit and thus as
an index of the credit level, Eq. (15) could also be interpreted as a fomalisation
of such a monetary policy.
For ρ > 0, the nominal money growth is a decreasing function of current
asset prices. In other words, the nominal money supply is contracted if the level
of asset prices is above b∗ and expanded if the level is below. For ρ ∈ (−1, 0),
the nominal money growth rate is an increasing function of current asset prices
but less than proportional. In the following, we call a rule with ρ > 0 an active
one and a rule with ρ ∈ (−1, 0) a passive one.
Money is distributed by the monetary authority to young households through
a lump-sum transfer τt = (Mt+1 −Mt)/pt, or equivalently,
τt = pit+1mt+1 −mt (16)
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Assuming that the monetary transfer is distributed in the first period of life
and not in the second period, we closely follow Michel and Wigniolle (2005).
This assumption seems to be appropriate to study the role of savings and the
portfolio choice on dynamics. Actually, the monetary transfer distributed in the
second period of life negatively affects the amount of individual savings.
2.3 Asset paper
Following Tirole (1985), Weil (1987) and more recently Bosi and Segmuller
(2010), we assume that there is an asset paper, without fundamental value,
which may be use to save. It is supplied in a constant amount, normalized to
one. Thus, Bt denotes its monetary price, and it+1 the growth rate of this price:
Bt+1 = (1 + it+1)Bt (17)
The asset is called a bubble, when its price is non-negative, i.e. Bt > 0. Using
real variables, Eq. (17) can be rewritten:
bt+1 =
1 + it+1
pit+1
bt (18)
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
Substituting Eq. (16) in the first-period budget constraint (8), we determine:
ct +mt + bt = e (19)
Using Eqs. (9), (10), (18) and (19) , we obtain:
mt+1 = bt+1
γ (bt)
1− γ (bt) (20)
ct = e− bt
1− γ (bt−1) (21)
dt+1 =
bt+1
1− γ (bt) (22)
As ct > 0, we deduce an upper bound on bt from Eq. (21):
0 ≤ bt < [1− γ (bt−1)] e ≡ b¯ (bt−1) (23)
Using Eqs. (14), (18) and (20), we deduce the inflation factor and the rental
rate on the asset paper:
pit+1 = µt
γ (bt−1)
γ (bt)
1− γ (bt)
1− γ (bt−1)
bt
bt+1
(24)
1 + it+1 = µt
γ (bt−1)
γ (bt)
1− γ (bt)
1− γ (bt−1) (25)
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Substituting Eqs.(19)-(25) into Eq. (12), we obtain the consumers’ intertem-
poral trade-off :
u′
(
e− bt1−γ(bt−1)
)
βv′
(
bt+1
1−γ(bt)
) = bt+1bt [1− η1 (bt)]
1− γ (bt) + [γ (bt)− η1 (bt)]µt γ(bt−1)γ(bt)
1−γ(bt)
1−γ(bt−1)
(26)
Note that b0 is not predetermined in period 0. However, the second-order
recurrence equation (26) has a predetermined variable at period t, bt−1. At this
stage, it is relevant to clarify that from Assumption 1, the inequality (23) is
satisfied.
From Eqs. (14), (15), and (20), we obtain:
pit+1
µ∗
=
[
γ (bt−1)
1− γ (bt−1)
1− γ (bt)
γ (bt)
bt
bt+1
] 1
1+α
(
bt
b∗
) −ρ
1+α
(27)
Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (15), we get the following expression of the
money growth factor:
µt = µ
∗
[
γ (bt−1)
1− γ (bt−1)
1− γ (bt)
γ (bt)
bt
bt+1
] −α
1+α
(
bt
b∗
) −ρ
1+α
(28)
Definition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, an intertemporal equilibrium with per-
fect foresight is a sequence (bt), with 0 ≤ bt < b¯ (bt−1) and t = 0, 1, ...,+∞, such
that Eq. (26) is satisfied, where µt is given by Eq. (28).
For further references, note that substituting Eqs. (18) and (20) into Eq. (11)
allows us to rewrite Assumption 3:
1 < 1 + it+1 < 1/η1 (bt) (29)
for t = 0, 1, ...,+∞, which ensures that the cash-in-advance constraint is bind-
ing.
In the following, we will use this definition of the equilibrium to show the
existence of expectation-driven fluctuations of the rational bubble and study
the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy. For this purpose, we first analyze
the steady state. We will see that some new interesting results, related to the
multiplicity of solutions and based on credit market features, will be obtained.
4 Steady state analysis
A bubbly steady state is a solution solving:
u′
(
e− b1−γ(b)
)
βv′
(
b
1−γ(b)
) = 1− η1 (b)
1− γ (b) + [γ (b)− η1 (b)]µ (b) , (30)
11
where µ (b) ≡ µ∗ (b/b∗)−ρ/(1+α) is obtained from Eq. (28).
In the following, we first study the existence of the bubbly steady state.13
Second, we establish the existence of a normalized steady state. The issue of
uniqueness versus multiplicity of stationary solutions is finally addressed.
4.1 Existence and uniqueness
The following assumption helps us to prove the existence of a steady state with
a positive bubble:
Assumption 4 If ρ > 0,
εv (0) <
η1 (0)
[1− η1 (0)]
[1− γ (0)] [µ (0)− 1]
{1− γ (0) + µ (0) [γ (0)− η1 (0)]}(
2− η2 (0)
1− η1 (0)
)
+
ρ
1 + α
µ (0) [γ (0)− η1 (0)] / [1− η1 (0)]
1− γ (0) + µ (0) [γ (0)− η1 (0)]
The next proposition proves the existence of a bubbly steady state and
provides a result on uniqueness.
Proposition 1 Let b¯ be defined by e = b¯/[1 − γ (b¯)]. Under Assumptions 1-
4, there exists a steady state characterized by a positive bubble, b∗ ∈ (0, b¯).
The uniqueness of the steady state is ensured if the following condition holds ∀
b ∈ (0, b¯):
εv (d) >
b
c [1− γ (b)] [ε
s
u (b)− εu (c)] , (31)
with εsu (b) ≡
c [1− γ (b)]
b
{
η1 (b)
1− η1 (b)
[1− γ (b)] [µ (b)− 1]
1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)](
2− η2 (b)
1− η1 (b)
)
+
ρ
1 + α
µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
1
1− η1 (b)
}
c = e− b
1− γ (b) and d =
b
1− γ (b)
Proof. See Appendix.
Under a constant credit share, 1 − γ (η1 = 0), and a passive rule on asset
prices (ρ ≤ 0), the condition (31) is always satisfied. This is also the case when
the degrees of concavity of utility function are large enough. However, the
multiplicity of steady states may occur when the condition (31) is not satisfied
for all b ∈ (0, b¯). We clarify this in the next section.
We remind that the monetary authority specifies targets for inflation and
asset prices, choosing the stationary values of an existing steady state. From
Proposition 1, a steady state with bubble b∗ always exists. We assume that the
monetary authority selects this equilibrium b∗ as a target.
13Since we are interested in persistent bubble fluctuations, we do not focus on the existence
of steady states without bubble.
12
4.2 Normalized steady state and multiplicity
In order to facilitate the analysis of the multiplicity of steady states and of local
dynamics (Sections 5 and 6), we establish the existence of a normalized steady
state b∗ = 1 (NSS). We follow the procedure introduced by Cazzavillan et al.
(1998) and use the scaling parameter β to give conditions for the existence of
such a steady state.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique value β∗ > 0
given by
β∗ =
u′
(
e− 11−γ(1)
)
v′
(
1
1−γ(1)
)
1−η1(1)
1−γ(1)+µ(1)[γ(1)−η1(1)]
such that b∗ = 1 is a steady state of the dynamic equation (26).
Thereafter, we assume β = β∗ so that b∗ = 1. At the normalized steady state,
µ (1) = µ∗ = pi (see Eq. (14)) and pi = 1 + i (see Eq. (18)). From the inequality
(29), Assumption 3 is satisfied if and only if:
1 < µ∗ < 1/η1 (1) (32)
Furthermore, the second order conditions are satisfied for εu > ε˜u, with ε˜u ≡
c∗ (1−γ)
2η1(µ
∗−1)
[1−γ+µ∗(γ−η1)]2 [2− η2/(1− η1)]. We further note εu and εv the degrees of
concavity εu (c) and εv (d) evaluated at the steady state b
∗ = 1, εsu ≡ εsu (1),
γ ≡ γ (1), η1 ≡ η1 (1), and η2 ≡ η2 (1).
We can now clarify the conditions for the multiplicity of steady states.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-4, if the following condition holds:
εv <
1
c (1− γ) (ε
s
u − εu) , (33)
then there is a multiplicity of stationary equilibria with positive bubble. Their
number is generically odd.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the monetary rule does not respond to asset prices (ρ = 0), the ine-
quality (33) can be satisfied only if collateral has a small effect on the credit
share (i.e. η1 < γ) and ε
s
u is positive.
14 Thinking that this is interesting to
connect the multiplicity of steady states to local dynamics, we assume for the
remainder of the paper:
14When ρ = 0, the second order conditions are satisfied if εu > ε˜u, and εsu > ε˜u is satisfied
only when η1 < γ.
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Assumption 5
η2 < 2 (1− η1)
Assumption 5 ensures εsu > 0.
When the monetary rule takes into account asset prices, the inequality (33)
is satisfied when the degrees of concavity εv and εu are small enough, when an
active rule on asset prices (ρ > 0) is implemented and collateral has a small
effect on the credit share (i.e. η1 < γ) or when a passive rule (ρ < 0) on asset
prices is implemented and collateral has a large effect on the credit share (i.e.
η1 > γ).
With the multiplicity of steady states, convergence or not to a steady state
may depend on agents’ expectations.15 The existence of multiple steady states
may lead to a global indeterminacy, which is a source of expectation-driven
fluctuations of the bubble. Interestingly, when the monetary policy rule does
not depend on asset prices, this multiplicity appears under a small collateral
effect (i.e. η1 small with η1 < γ) and small degrees of concavity on utility.
Furthermore, the multiplicity of steady states raises an issue for the mo-
netary authority concerning the choice of the rule. If the monetary authority
chooses to lead an active policy for the steady state b∗ = 1, this does not mean
that the policy would be active at the other steady states. This issue of selection
is addressed for instance by Benhabib et al. (2001). Nonetheless, in our model,
the multiplicity of steady states arises without introducing any bound on the
monetary rule.
Illustration. The example given by Eq. (7) may fit all the requirements we
impose on the function γ(bt). This is examined showing the non-emptiness of
the set of parameter values implied by Assumptions 2− 5.
The function γ(bt) =
A
s exp(−sbt), with 0 < A < s(1 − ) and  sufficiently
close to 0, satisfies of course Assumption 2.
In Section 3, we show that Assumption 3 rewrites η1(bt) < 1 at the equilib-
rium. Note that our example of function γ(bt) satisfies this inequality for all bt,
because η1(bt) ≤ As exp(−sbt) ≤ As < 1.
When ρ > 0, the existence of a steady state with a positive bubble requires
Assumption 4. With our example, we can rewrite Assumption 4 as follows:
εv (0) <
ρ
1 + α
(34)
For α < +∞, the right-hand side is positive and different from zero. As a
consequence, an utility function whose the degree of concavity is increasing in
consumption can satisfy the above inequality (34). A possible illustration of
such an utility function is provided by the following formulation:
v(d) = (
d− δ0
1− δ1 )
1−δ1 , i.e. εv(d) =
δ1d
d− δ0
15Note that, in our model, this multiplicity will be related to the local indeterminacy.
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We obtain εv(0) = 0. Therefore, Assumption 4 is always verified with our
example of γ(bt).
To connect the multiplicity of steady states to local dynamics, Assumption
5 must be satisfied at the normalized steady state. With our example of γ(bt),
Assumption 5 is equivalent to:
s(2− s)− (2 + s)Aexp(−s) > 0
As exp(−s) < 1, A < s(2−s)2+s ≡ A1 is a sufficient condition to ensure this last
inequality. As a result, if s < 2 and A < A1, then Assumption 5 is always
satisfied.
In the following, we admit two cases for the analysis of local dynamics γ > η1
and γ < η1. γ > η1 requires A <
s(1−s)
exp(−s) ≡ A2 and s < 1, whereas s > 1 is a
sufficient condition for γ < η1 whatever the value of A.
To summarize, when γ > η1, the non-empty set of parameter values for which
Assumptions 2−5 are always satisfied is given by 0 < A < min{A1;A2; s(1−)}
and 0 < s < 1. When γ < η1, A < min{A1, s(1 − )} and 1 < s < 2 is a non-
empty set of parameter values for which Assumptions 2−5 are always satisfied.
5 Expectation-driven fluctuations and endoge-
nous cycles
This section is devoted to the existence of expectation-driven fluctuations of a
rational bubble. Our explanation mainly lies in credit markets features. We
will show that the steady state with a positive bubble can be locally indetermi-
nate, and therefore expectation-driven fluctuations of the bubble can emerge.
To highlight bubble fluctuations, we consider the model with a constant money
growth, first when the credit share is constant, second when collateral matters.
When the credit share is constant, indeterminacy always occurs under a suf-
ficiently large degree of utility concavity. In contrast, when the credit share
depends on asset holdings, we obtain a new interesting result: indeterminacy
also occurs under a sufficiently small degree of utility concavity and arbitrarily
small credit market distortions. In the next section, we enrich the model with
monetary rules based on inflation forecast targeting and on asset prices to study
the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy.
5.1 Local dynamics: preliminaries
To derive our different results, we start by linearizing the dynamic equation (26)
around the steady state b∗ = 1 to obtain the characteristic polynomial.
Assumption 6
εv 6=
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) 11+α
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) ≡ ε¯v
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Using this assumption, we get:
Lemma 3 Let
ε¯u ≡ −c∗ (1− γ) µ
∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ [γ − η1]
1/γ
1 + α
(35)
Under Assumptions 1-6, the characteristic polynomial, evaluated at the steady
state b∗ = 1, is defined by P (X) ≡ X2 − TX +D = 0, where:
D =
1
ε¯v − εv
η1
c∗ (1− γ) (εu − ε¯u) ≡ D (εv) (36)
T =
1
ε¯v − εv
{
εu
c∗ (1− γ) − η1εv +
(1− γ)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) [1−
(µ∗ − 1) η1
(
2− η2
1− η1
)]
+
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− ρ+ η1/γ
1 + α
}
≡ T (εv) (37)
Proof. See Appendix.
As in Grandmont et al. (1998), we study the variations of the trace T (εv)
and the determinant D (εv) in the (T,D) plane as one of the parameters of
interest, namely εv, is made to vary continuously in its admissible range (0,+∞)
(see Figures 1 and 2). The locus Σ ≡ {(T (εv) , D (εv)) : εv ≥ 0} describes a
part of a line that we call the Σ-line.
Along the line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1 (D = T − 1). Along the
line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1 (D = −T − 1). Along the segment
[BC] (|T | < 2, D = 1), the characteristic roots are complex conjugates with
modulus equal to 1. These lines divide the space (T,D) into three different
types of regions. Therefore, inside the triangle ABC, the steady state is a sink,
i.e. locally indeterminate (|T | < 1+D and D < 1). It is a saddle point if (T,D)
lies on the right or left sides of both the lines (AB) and (AC) (|1 +D| < |T |).
It is a source otherwise.
A (local) bifurcation arises when at least one eigenvalue crosses the unit
circle, that is, when the Σ-line crosses one of the loci (AB), (AC) or [BC].
According to the changes of the bifurcation parameter, a pitchfork bifurcation
(generically) emerges when the Σ-line crosses (AC), as εv goes through ε
s
v.
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A flip bifurcation occurs when the Σ-line crosses (AB), as εv goes through
εfv . Finally, a Hopf bifurcation (generically) arises when the Σ-line crosses the
segment [BC], as εv goes through ε
h
v .
17
The Σ-line has a slope S given by:
S =
η1
c∗(1−γ) (εu − ε¯u)
εu
c∗(1−γ) − η1 ε¯uc∗(1−γ) +
(1−γ)
[
1−η1−η1(µ∗−1)
(
2− η21−η1
)]
1−γ+µ∗(γ−η1) +
1−η1−ρ
1+α
µ∗(γ−η1)
1−γ+µ∗(γ−η1)
(38)
16Indeed, we have (generically) an odd number of steady states (see Section 4.2).
17The bifurcation values of εv , εsv , ε
f
v and ε
h
v , are given in Appendix.
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We further note that the Σ-line is characterized by the endpoint (T (+∞) , D (+∞))
≡ (η1, 0) and the starting point given by:
T (0) =
1
ε¯v
{
εu
c∗ (1− γ) +
(1− γ)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
[
1− (µ∗ − 1) η1
(
2− η2
1− η1
)]
+
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− ρ+ η1/γ
1 + α
}
(39)
D (0) =
1
ε¯v
[
η1
c∗ (1− γ) (εu − ε¯u)
]
(40)
with 1− T (0) +D (0) = 1
ε¯v
(1− η1)
c∗ (1− γ) (ε
s
u − εu) (41)
and εsu ≡ c∗
1− γ
1− η1
{
η1
(1− γ) (µ∗ − 1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
(
2− η2
1− η1
)
+
ρ
1 + α
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
}
(42)
5.2 Fluctuations of a bubble
As already underlined, to prove the existence of bubble fluctuations, the mo-
netary policy is assumed to neither depend on inflation forecasts, nor on asset
prices (i.e. α = ρ = 0). Moreover, to highlight the role played by collateral on
the credit share, we begin by analyzing the case of a constant credit share (i.e.
η1 = η2 = 0).
5.2.1 Constant credit share
When γ is constant (i..e. η1 = η2 = 0), the trace T (εv) and the determinant
D(εv) simplify to:
T (εv) = 1 +
1
1− εv
(
εu
c∗ (1− γ) + εv
)
and D (εv) = 0
As a consequence, the slope of the Σ-line is equal to 0.
Since T (εv) is strictly increasing in εv and T (0) > 1, when εv varies from 0
to +∞, (T (εv), D(εv)) moves on the Σ-line, which lies on the horizontal axis,
starting from the right side of (AC), crossing ±∞ when εv goes through 1, then
(AB) as εv = ε
f
v , and ending at (0, 0) (see Figure 1).
Proposition 4 Let γ be constant (i.e. η1 = 0 and η2 = 0). Under Assumptions
1-6, the following generically holds:
The bubbly steady state is a saddle for εv < ε
f
v , undergoes a flip bifurcation
for εv = ε
f
v , and is a sink for εv > ε
f
v .
This proposition shows that persistent fluctuations due to self-fulfilling ex-
pectations could emerge around the bubbly steady state. Expectation-driven
17
Figure 1: Constant credit share
fluctuations and two-period cycles occur under a significant income effect. This
confirms the well-known result obtained by Grandmont (1985, 1986) even if
there are two assets in our model, a bubble and money held for a transaction
motive. The economic intuition is the following. If households expect an in-
crease in inflation from period t to t + 1, then they reduce their first-period
consumption, and increase their global savings, bt + mt. As γ is constant,
portfolio choice is unchanged. However, households reduce their second-period
consumption implying a decrease in the return on savings.18 It follows a raise in
inflation and a reduction of the bubble value. Thus, the beliefs are self-fulfilling,
and expectation-driven fluctuations emerge.
5.2.2 The role of collateral
We analyze now the role of collateral on expectation-driven fluctuations taking
into account that η1 is not too large.
19 However, we admit either η1 < γ or
η1 > γ. In the first case, collateral has a small effect on the credit share, while
collateral has a large effect in the second one.
To identify the indeterminacy properties of the steady state b∗ = 1, we study
how the Σ-line evolves in the (T,D) plane in function of η1. We assume
18From the binding cash-in-advance constraint and the money growth factor (Eq. (15)),
we obtain γdt+1 = (µ∗/pit+1)mt when η1 = 0. We can see if dt+1 is decreasing and mt
increasing, µ∗/pit+1 must decrease.
19When η1 is large enough, results are qualitatively similar except that Hopf bifurcations
are possible.
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Assumption 7 η1 is not too large, such that:
1 >
η1
1− η1 (µ
∗ − 1)
(
2− η2
1− η1
)
(43)
Assumption 7 appears reasonable since it implies a not excessively large
effect of collateral on the credit share.
From direct inspection of the different bifurcation values εfv , ε
h
v and ε
s
v, we
deduce that under Assumptions 1− 7:
εsv < ε
h
v < ε
f
v (44)
The inequality (44) means that T (εv) is increasing in εv. Hence, (T (εv), D(εv))
goes rightward crossing ±∞ when εv goes through ε¯v.
Let SC > 0 be the critical value of S such that the Σ-line goes through the
point C.20 When η1 < γ, it can easily be shown from Eq. (38) and the inequality
(44) that the Σ-line has a slope in (0, SC) under Assumptions 1−7. In addition,
the Σ-line starts inside the triangle ABC for ε˜u < εu < ε
s
u, then crosses (AC)
as εv = ε
s
v, goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing (AB) as εv = ε
f
v , and ends
at (T (+∞), D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis.21 When εu > εsu, the Σ-line starts
outside the triangle ABC, on the right side of (AC) (see Figure 2).
The Σ-line still has a slope S in (0, SC) when η1 > γ and εu > ε¯u, but a
slope S in (SB , 0) when η1 > γ and εu < ε¯u, where SB < 0 is the critical value of
S such that the Σ-line goes through the point B.22 Since T (εv) is increasing in
εv, the Σ-line points upwards (downwards) to the right when εu > ε¯u (εu < ε¯u).
Moreover, the Σ-line always starts on the right side of (AC).23 Afterwards, the
Σ-line goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing (AB) as εv = ε
f
v , and ends at
(T (+∞), D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis (see Figure 2).
Proposition 5 (η1 > 0: collateral matters)
Under Assumptions 1-7, the following generically holds:
1. If η1 < γ and εu ∈ (ε˜u, εsu): the steady state is a sink for εv < εsv,
undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation for εv = ε
s
v, is a saddle for εv ∈
(
εsv, ε
f
v
)
,
undergoes a flip bifurcation for εv = ε
f
v , is a sink for εv > ε
f
v .
2. If η1 < γ and εu > ε
s
u or if η1 > γ: the steady state is a saddle for εv < ε
f
v ,
undergoes a flip bifurcation for εv = ε
f
v , is a sink for εv > ε
f
v .
Proposition 5 establishes that local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles
could occur under sufficiently large income effects (εv > ε
f
v ), but also more sur-
prisingly under sufficiently small income effects (εv < ε
s
v). This requires that
collateral matters, but has a sufficiently small effect on the credit share (i.e.
η1 < γ). Interestingly, this is also associated to the multiplicity of steady states
200 < SC = 1/ (2− η1) < 1.
21When η1 < γ, 1− T (0)−D (0) > 0 is satisfied for ε˜u < εu < εsu.
22−1 < SB = −1/ (2 + η1) < 0.
23When η1 > γ, εsu < ε˜u < εu for ρ = 0. Hence 1− T (0)−D (0) < 0.
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Figure 2: The role of collateral
(see Proposition 3). The intuition is the following. If households expect an
increase in inflation from period t to t + 1, then they reduce their first-period
consumption, and increase their savings if the income effect dominates. The
intuition is similar to the previous one with a constant γ. However, when in-
come effects are small, this mechanism is no more relevant. As collateral now
matters, a change in the portfolio structure takes place: an expected inflation
rise generates now a portfolio effect, which leads to expectation-driven fluctu-
ations when income effects are small. Because the return on money is lower
than the return on asset paper, households reallocate savings from monetary
mt to non-monetary savings, i.e. the bubble bt. The amount of collateral in-
creases. Hence, households consume less by cash, which implies that the return
on money decreases. An effective rise in inflation takes place, and expectations
are self-fulfilling.
We have shown that a rational bubble could experience endogenous fluc-
tuations driven by the volatility of agents’ expectations. We turn now to the
analysis of the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy.
6 The (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy
The question we address now is: can a monetary policy protect the economy
against such bubble fluctuations driven by the volatility of agents’ expectations?
20
The issue has been essentially explored within economies without collateral and
portfolio choice (Grandmont (1985, 1986), Sorger (2005)). While Grandmont
(1985, 1986) describes as stabilizing a monetary policy coordinating expecta-
tions, a monetary policy is stabilizing in our framework as soon as it reduces
the range of parameter values for which expectation-driven fluctuations occur.
In line with Sorger (2005), we first study an inflation forecast targeting rule
which responds only to the expected inflation (α 6= 0 and ρ = 0). Note that
such a rule is of interest since it seems to be relevant to describe the US mone-
tary policy than a rule based on observed inflation (Bernanke (2010)). Second,
we analyze a rule taking into account asset prices. Considering such a monetary
rule may be appropriate in an economy in which a bubble could persist and ex-
perience fluctuations. Thus, we contribute to the debate initiated by Bernanke
and Gertler (1999, 2001), whether central banks should react to movements in
asset prices. We extend the inflation targeting rule by including directly asset
price level (α 6= 0 and ρ 6= 0). Our findings mitigate the conclusions issued by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), and more re-
cently Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007). Compared with the first two ones, we show
that such a rule may have a significant effect on the macroeconomic stability.
Unlike to Calstrom and Fuerst (2007), such a rule stabilizes fluctuations.
To do this, we examine how local dynamics are altered by the implementation
of monetary policy. As previously, our analysis focuses on a not too large value
of η1.
6.1 Inflation forecast targeting
Referring to Sorger (2005), we start by analyzing the stabilizing role of inflation
forecast targeting on the emergence of fluctuations. However, we consider a
model with two assets, a bubble and money held for a transaction motive, and
most importantly in which collateral matters. We will see that this last feature
may reverse the conclusion obtained by Sorger (2005) that an active rule on
inflation forecasts tends to destabilize.
The monetary authority conducts a monetary rule given by Eq. (15) with
ρ = 0:
µt = µ
∗
(
pit+1
µ∗
)−α
, with α ≥ −1.
The purpose is to evaluate whether inflation forecast targeting stabilizes or
rather destabilizes expectation-driven fluctuations around the bubbly steady
state. As in the previous section, focusing on the geometrical elements, we can
easily check that under Assumptions 1− 7, the slope S is always positive when
η1 < γ and could be negative when η1 > γ.
For any value of α, when η1 < γ, the Σ-line has a slope between (0, SC)
and starts inside the triangle ABC for ε˜u < εu < ε
s
u, then crosses (AC) as
εv = ε
s
v, goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing (AB) as εv = ε
f
v , and ends
at (T (+∞), D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis. When εu > εsu, the Σ-line starts
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on the right side of (AC). These configurations are very similar to Proposition
5.
When η1 > γ, to keep things as simple as possible, we assume:
Assumption 8 Let αA and αB be given in Appendix by Eqs. (55) and (56).
α > α˜, with α˜ = max{αA, αB}
We can note that α˜ < 0 may be close to −1, especially if the difference
between η1 and γ is not too large or under small distortions (η1 and γ close to
zero). Hence, this assumption does not seem to be restrictive.
Again, the configurations are quite similar to Proposition 5 under Assump-
tions 1−8. Indeed, for α > α˜, the inequality (44) is satisfied, and when εu ≥ ε¯u
(εu < ε¯u), the Σ-line has a slope S between (0, SC) (between (SB , 0)), always
starts on the right side of (AC), goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing (AB)
between A and B as εv = ε
f
v , and ends at (T (+∞), D (+∞)).
To summarize, when η1 < γ, local indeterminacy occurs if εv < ε
s
v or if
εv > ε
f
v , and when η1 > γ, if εv > ε
f
v . Hence, to analyze the role of the
monetary policy, we only need to examine how these critical bifurcation values,
εfv and ε
s
v, vary in function of α. Indeed, these variations give a picture of the
role of monetary policy on local indeterminacy.
Lemma 4 (α 6= 0 and ρ = 0)
Under Assumptions 1-7, the effects of monetary policy on the bifurcation
values are given by the following derivatives:
1. When η1 < γ,
dεsv
dα = 0 and
dεfv
dα < 0.
2. When η1 > γ,
dεfv
dα > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
If η1 < γ, the higher α is, the lower ε
f
v is. On the other hand, ε
s
v does not
depend on α (see Figure 3(a)).24 Hence, we can deduce the (de-)stabilizing role
of an inflation targeting monetary policy.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-7, the following generically holds when
η1 < γ:
1. The more active the monetary policy is (α higher), the more destabilizing
it is in the neighborhood of the steady state b∗, for large income effects.
2. A more active monetary policy has no destabilizing or stabilizing effects
in the neighborhood of the steady state b∗, for small income effects.
24Figure 3(a) qualitatively illustrates the case εu ∈ (ε˜u, εsu). For εu > εsu, the figure would
be qualitatively the same but without the line εsv .
22
(a) η1 < γ (b) η1 > γ
Figure 3: Stabilizing role of inflation forecast targeting
This proposition suggests that when εv > ε
f
v , an active inflation forecast
targeting promotes the emergence of expectation-driven fluctuations, while a
passive policy may rule out it. This is in accordance with Sorger (2005), even
if we assume that the monetary transfer is distributed at the first period of
life and there is a portfolio choice. However, such a monetary policy does not
(de-)stabilize fluctuations which occur for small εv. This also means that a
monetary policy, which responds only to expected inflation, has no impact on
the multiplicity of steady states.
We focus now on the case η1 > γ, we remind that local indeterminacy
requires εv > ε
f
v . From Lemma 4, we deduce that the higher α is, the larger ε
f
v
is (see Figure 3(b)).
The next proposition summarizes the role of an inflation targeting monetary
policy when η1 > γ:
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1-8, the following generically holds when
η1 > γ: the more active the monetary policy is, the more stabilizing it is in the
neighborhood of the steady state b∗, for large income effects.
This proposition means that, for large income effects, a sufficiently active
monetary policy hardens the condition on εv, which guarantees local indetermi-
nacy. An active inflation forecast targeting could stabilize the fluctuations of the
rational bubble. This mitigates the clear-cut conclusion given by Sorger (2005),
i.e. an active inflation targeting is preferable to an active inflation forecast
targeting in terms of stabilization.
To summarize, the stabilizing role of active inflation forecast targeting de-
pends on the sensibility of the credit share with respect to collateral. A suffi-
ciently large sensitivity of credit share to collateral is the source of the stabilizing
role of an active monetary policy. However, such a monetary rule has no effect
on fluctuations occurring for small income effects.
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6.2 Monetary rule with asset price level
To answer the question addressed in particular by Bernanke and Gertler (2001)
“Should central banks respond to movements in asset prices?”, we enrich the
inflation forecast targeting rule. The money growth factor also responds to asset
price deviation from the stationary value b∗:
µt = µ
∗
(
pit+1
µ∗
)−α(
bt
b∗
)−ρ
, with α ≥ −1, ρ ≥ −1.
We examine whether taking into account asset prices in the monetary rule
significantly alters the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy. Thus, we extend
our previous analysis to changes in asset prices for a given value of α.
When ρ increases from −1 to +∞, the location of the Σ-line in the plane
(T (εv), D(εv)) differs from the previous analysis.
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We begin with γ > η1. Let Sρ=0 be the slope of Σ-line when ρ = 0, which
is the slope studied in the previous section when the monetary policy does not
respond to asset prices (Section 6.1). When ρ = −1, the configuration is quite
similar to Proposition 5. Indeed, the slope S of Σ-line belongs to (0, Sρ=0) (see
Eq. (38)) and εsv < ε
h
v < ε
f
v . However, under some parameter restrictions, ε
s
v
is negative. As a result, when ρ = −1, the Σ-line starts on the left side of
(AC),26 goes rightwards, then goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing (AB)
between the points A and B as εv = ε
f
v , and ends at (T (+∞), D (+∞)) on the
horizontal axis. Afterwards, as the slope S of the Σ-line is increasing in ρ, the Σ-
line makes a counterclockwise rotation around the endpoint (T (+∞), D(+∞))
when ρ increases. Thus, the Σ-line first goes through C (i.e. εsv = ε
h
v ), second
through A (i.e. εsv = ε
f
v ), then through B (i.e. ε
f
v = ε
h
v ), and becomes flat close
to zero.
We focus now on η1 > γ. As for the previous case, we study the location of
the Σ-line in the (T,D) plane when ρ = −1. In contrast to γ > η1, the configu-
rations are quite different to Proposition 5 under some parameter restrictions.27
When η1 > γ and εu < ε¯u, the Σ-line also makes a counterclockwise rotation
around the endpoint (T (+∞), D(+∞)) when ρ increases.28 However, for ρ =
−1, the slope S of Σ-line is between (0, SC) (see Eq. (38)) and εfv < 0 < εhv <
εsv under some parameter restrictions. This means that T (εv) and D(εv) are
decreasing in εv. As a consequence, when ρ = −1, the Σ-line starts on the
left side of (AB), goes leftwards, then goes inside the triangle ABC by crossing
(AC) between the points A and C as εv = ε
s
v, and ends at (T (+∞), D (+∞)) on
the horizontal axis. Afterwards, as the Σ-line makes a counterclockwise rotation
when ρ increases, the Σ-line goes first through C (i.e. εsv = ε
h
v ), second through
A (i.e. εsv = ε
f
v ), then through B (i.e. ε
f
v = ε
h
v ), and becomes flat close to zero,
as ρ increases.
When η1 > γ and εu ≥ ε¯u, the configuration is still different to Proposition 5
for ρ = −1. Indeed, the slope S is between (SB , 0) for ρ = −1 and εfv < 0 < εhv <
25Obviously, for ρ = 0, Propositions 6 and 7 apply.
26When ρ = −1, the configuration with εsv > 0 is quite similar to εsv < 0, except that the
Σ-line starts inside the triangle ABC. However, as regards the stabilizing virtues of monetary
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Figure 4: Stabilizing role of monetary policy with asset prices when η1 < γ
Figure 5: Stabilizing role of monetary policy with asset prices when η1 > γ and
εu < ε¯u.
policy, our results are the same qualitatively.
27Figures 5 and 6 depict the configuration where ρA > −1, where ρA is defined by εfv = εsv .
28Indeed, when η1 > γ and εu < ε¯u, S is increasing in ρ.
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εsv under some parameter restrictions (see Eq. (38)). This means that T (εv)
is decreasing in εv, and D(εv) is increasing in εv. As a result, when ρ = −1,
the Σ-line starts on the left side of (AB), goes leftwards, then goes inside the
triangle ABC by crossing (AC) between the points A and C as εv = ε
s
v, and
ends at (T (+∞), D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis. Then, as the slope S is
decreasing in ρ, the Σ-line makes a clockwise rotation when ρ increases. Thus,
the Σ-line goes first through B (i.e. εfv = ε
h
v ), second through A (i.e. ε
s
v = ε
f
v ),
then through C (i.e. εsv = ε
h
v ), and becomes flat close to zero, as ρ increases.
Figure 6: Stabilizing role of monetary policy with asset prices when η1 > γ and
εu ≥ ε¯u.
To summarize, when η1 < γ, local indeterminacy occurs if εv < min
(
εsv, ε
f
v , ε
h
v
)
and if εv > max
(
εfv , ε
s
v
)
(see Figure 4).29 When η1 > γ and εu < ε¯u, local
indeterminacy emerges if εv < min
(
εsv, ε
f
v
)
and if εv > max
(
εsv, ε
h
v , ε
f
v
)
(see
Figure 5). Finally, when η1 > γ and εu ≥ ε¯u, local indeterminacy arises if
εv < min
(
εsv, ε
f
v , ε
h
v
)
and if εv > max
(
εfv , ε
s
v
)
(see Figure 6).
Now, we study how these critical bifurcation values, εsv, ε
f
v and ε
h
v , vary with
respect to ρ.30
Lemma 5 Under Assumptions 1-7, the effects of the monetary policy ρ on the
bifurcation values are given by the following derivatives:
1. When η1 < γ,
dεsv
dρ > 0,
dεfv
dρ < 0 and
dεhv
dρ = 0.
29Figures 4-6 give just qualitative illustrations. Furthermore, Figure 4 depicts the stabilizing
role of monetary policy when η1 < γ and εu > εsu for ρ = 0. If εu < ε
s
u for ρ = 0, then ε
s
v
would be positive in Figure 4.
30More details are available upon request.
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2. When η1 > γ,
dεsv
dρ < 0,
dεfv
dρ > 0 and
dεhv
dρ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let ρA be the crossing point between εsv and ε
f
v .
31 The next proposition
summarizes the role of a monetary policy on local indeterminacy for a given
value of α:
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1-8, the following generically holds:
1. If −1 < ρ < ρA, the more passive the monetary policy is, the more stabi-
lizing it is in the neighborhood of the steady state b∗.
2. If ρA < ρ, the more active the monetary policy is, the more stabilizing it
is in the neighborhood of the steady state b∗.
Whatever the size of collateral effect and the degree of income effects, a
sufficiently active monetary policy taking asset prices into account (i.e. ρ > ρA)
hardens the condition on εv, which leads to local indeterminacy. Hence, an
active monetary rule taking asset prices into account makes the economy more
stable around the targeted steady state.
We remind that the multiplicity of steady states is connected to εv < ε
s
v.
The next proposition summarizes, for a given value of α, the role of a monetary
policy on the multiplicity of steady states, which can be a source of global
indeterminacy32:
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions 1-8, the following generically holds:
1. When η1 < γ, the more passive the monetary policy is, the smaller the
range of values εv, under which the multiplicity of steady states exists, is.
2. When η1 > γ, the more active the monetary policy is, the smaller the
range of values εv, under which the multiplicity of steady states exists, is.
We deduce from Proposition 9 that when η1 < γ, a passive monetary rule
makes global indeterminacy less likely to emerge. This means that even if an
active monetary rule can locally stabilize, a passive one may stabilize both
locally and globally. In other words, the steady state b∗ is getting determinate,
and the multiplicity of steady states disappears.
When η1 > γ, we have an opposite result: a sufficiently active monetary
policy, taking asset prices into account, makes global indeterminacy less likely
to emerge. The steady state b∗ becomes determinate, and the multiplicity of
steady states disappears. Hence, when collateral sufficiently matters, an active
monetary rule can stabilize both locally and globally.
31The value of ρA is given in Appendix. We can easily show that when η1 < γ, ρA > 0.
32From the steady state analysis (see Section 4.2), we know that εv < εsv is a sufficient
condition to obtain the multiplicity of steady states. Therefore, ensuring εv > εsv is a way
to eliminate, at least, stationary solutions not too far from b∗ = 1. This is what we call a
globally stabilizing monetary policy.
27
In any case, once asset prices are taken into account by the monetary author-
ity, a monetary rule stabilizes for small income effects and rules out the multi-
plicity of steady states, which is not the case when the monetary rule responds
to expected inflation only. More precisely, when collateral has a small effect on
the credit share, a passive monetary rule is stabilizing, and when collateral suf-
ficiently matters, an active one is stabilizing. Following the debate initiated by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and recently advanced by several Governors
of central bank or practitioners of monetary policy (Yellen (2009), Bernanke
(2010, 2011)), we provide a conclusion in favor of including asset prices in mo-
netary policy rules. Although our theoretical framework differs from dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium ones, our results are in accordance with some of
other recent contributions: under credit market imperfections, a monetary pol-
icy should respond to movements in asset prices to rule out expectation-driven
fluctuations.
7 Concluding remarks
We present a monetary overlapping generations model with two assets, bubble
and money needed to transaction motives, and a collateral effect. The endoge-
nous portfolio choice promotes expectation-driven fluctuations and the multi-
plicity of steady states for small income effects and arbitrarily small distortions.
When monetary policy only depends on expected inflation, a sufficiently
active policy can stabilize expectation-driven fluctuations occurring for large
income effects, if the collateral effect on the credit share is large enough. The
role of collateral in our model may overturn the conclusions obtained by Sorger
(2005). However, such a rule has no impact on the occurrence of expectation-
driven fluctuations for small income effects and on the multiplicity of steady
states.
In our model, a monetary policy including asset prices may rule out aggregate
fluctuations. Indeed, a sufficiently active rule stabilizes fluctuations around the
steady state both for small and large income effects, and whatever the collateral
effect on the credit share. In addition, a monetary rule on asset prices can
locally and globally stabilize fluctuations unlike a monetary rule which only
responds to inflation. More precisely, when collateral has a small effect on the
credit share, a passive monetary rule has a stabilizing role, and when collateral
sufficiently matters, an active one has a stabilizing role. Our results mitigate the
conclusions pronounced by Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), and reinforced
recently, for instance, by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007). Focusing on consumers’
credit constraints and endogenous bubble fluctuations, including asset prices in
monetary policy rules is powerful to rule out macroeconomic instability.
Note that this previous analysis is also conducted for a given value of α (see
Section 6.2). However, our results are not qualitatively modified by α. Indeed,
for a sufficiently large collateral effect on the credit share (i.e. γ < η1), an
increase in α reinforces mechanisms which lead to stabilize both locally and
28
globally, taking into account that ρ is not too small.33 Nonetheless, for a small
collateral effect (i.e. γ > η1), an increase in α reinforces mechanisms which
locally destabilize for large values of εv or a sufficiently large value of ρ.
Finally, our qualitative results are obtained for all value of monetary growth
factor’s target µ∗. Therefore, these conclusions are compatible with a target µ∗
which maximizes households’ welfare at the steady state. When the monetary
rule including asset prices is not too passive, µ∗ = 1 is an optimal rule. We
recognize the Friedman rule: no money growth and a nominal interest rate
equals to zero (µ∗ = 1 + i = 1). The intertemporal choices of households are no
longer affected by the distortions due to money holdings. From Eq. (30) at the
normalized steady state, we obtain u′ (e− 1/ [1− γ (1)]) = β∗v′ (1/ [1− γ (1)]),
which corresponds to the Phelps Golden rule in a monetary OLG model without
population growth. Thus, a stabilizing monetary rule, which eliminates the cost
of fluctuations, may be in accordance with welfare maximisation at the steady
state.
33This could be shown using the bifurcation values εfv , ε
h
v and ε
s
v (see Appendix).
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We maximize the Lagrangian function:
u (ct) + βv (dt+1)
+λ1t (e+ τt − pit+1mt+1 − bt − ct)
+λ2t
(
mt+1 +
1 + it+1
pit+1
bt − dt+1
)
+λ3t (mt+1 − γ (bt) dt+1) (45)
with respect to (ct, dt+1,mt+1, bt, λ1t, λ2t, λ3t). Since λ1t = u
′ (ct) > 0, then Eq.
(8) becomes binding. Because
λ2t = λ1t
1 + γ′ (bt) dt+1pit+1
1+it+1
pit+1
+ γ′ (bt) dt+1
(46)
λ3t = λ1t
(
pit+1 − 1 + pit+1γ
′ (bt) dt+1
1+it+1
pit+1
+ γ′ (bt) dt+1
)
(47)
strict positivity of λ2t and λ3t requires
pit+1 >
1 + γ′ (bt)pit+1dt+1
1+it+1
pit+1
+ γ′ (bt) dt+1
> 0 (48)
The inequality 1 + γ′ (bt)pit+1dt+1 > 0 is equivalent to the inequality (11).
Moreover, it+1 > 0 implies (1 + it+1) + γ
′ (bt)pit+1dt+1 > 1 + γ′ (bt)pit+1dt+1,
which ensures that the inequality (48) holds.
Proof of Lemma 2
We compute the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian function (45) with respect
to (ct, dt+1,mt+1, bt, λ1t, λ2t, λ3t)
34:
H ≡

u′′ 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 βv′′ 0 −λ3γ′ 0 −1 −γ
0 0 0 0 −pi 1 1
0 −γ′λ3 0 −γ′′λ3d −1 1+ipi −γ′d−1 0 −pi −1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 1+ipi 0 0 0
0 −γ 1 −γ′d 0 0 0

(49)
In order to get a strict local maximum, we need to check the negative de-
finition of H over the set of points satisfying the constraints. Let p and n the
numbers of constraints and variables. If the determinant of H has sign (−1)n,
34For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
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and the last n − p diagonal principal minors have alternating signs, then the
optimum is a regular local maximum. In our case n = 4 and p = 3. Therefore,
we simply require detH > 0, that is,
detH = −u′′
[
pi
(
γ′d+
1 + i
pi
γ
)
+ (1− γ)
]2
−βv′′
(
γ′d+
1 + i
pi
)2
+λ3 (1− γ)
[
2
(
γ′2d+ γ′
1 + i
pi
)
+ γ′′d (1− γ)
]
> 0 (50)
Using Eqs. (9) and (10), we find dt+1 =
bt
1−γ(bt)
1+it+1
pit+1
. Substituting in Eq.
(50), we get:
detH = − ( 1+ipi )2 [χ0 + χ21u′′ + βv′′ (1− η1)2] > 0
(51)
where
χ0 ≡ λ3η1 (1− γ)
2
b
[2 (1− η1)− η2] pi
1 + i
χ1 ≡ pi (γ − η1) + 1− γ
1 + i
pi
χ0 + χ
2
1u
′′ < 0 is a sufficient condition for detH > 0. Hence, the second
order conditions are satisfied if 35:
εu >
c(1− γ)2/b
[1− γ + (1 + i) (γ − η1)]2
iη1
(
2− η2
1− η1
)
≡ ε˜u (52)
whatever the value of εv ≥ 0
Proof of Proposition 1
A steady state b is a solution of g(b) = h(b), with:
g (b) ≡
u′
(
e− b1−γ(b)
)
βv′
(
b
1−γ(b)
) (53)
h (b) ≡ 1− η1 (b)
1− γ (b) + [γ (b)− η1 (b)]µ (b) (54)
Since b1−γ(b) is increasing in b and c > 0, then b < b¯, where b¯ > 0 is such
that e = b¯
1−γ(b¯) .
36 Therefore, all the stationary solutions b belong to
(
0, b
)
.
35For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
36With our specification for γ(b) function, b¯ is well defined under Assumption 3.
31
To prove the existence of a stationary solution b, we use the continuity of
g (b) and h (b). From Eqs. (32), (53) and (54), we determine the boundary values
of g (b) and h (b):
lim
b→0
g (b) =
u′ (e)
βv′ (0)
= 0+, lim
b→b¯
g (b) = +∞
lim
b→0
h (b) =
1− η1 (0)
1− γ (0) + [γ (0)− η1 (0)]µ (0) ≥ 0
lim
b→b¯
h (b) =
1− η1
(
b¯
)
1− γ (b¯)+ [γ (b¯)− η1 (b¯)]µ (b¯) > 0
We have limb→b¯ g (b) > limb→b¯ h (b). If −1 < ρ ≤ 0, µ (0) < +∞, which
implies limb→0 g (b) < limb→0 h (b). However, if ρ > 0, µ (0) = +∞, which
implies g (0) = h (0). In this case, the existence of a steady state b ∈ (0, b¯),
solving g (b) = h (b), is ensured by εg (0) < εh (0), where:
εg (b) ≡ g
′ (b) b
g (b)
= εu (c)
1− η1 (b)
1− γ (b)
b
c
+ [1− η1 (b)] εv (d) > 0
εh (b) ≡ h
′ (b) b
h (b)
= η1 (b)
[1− γ (b)] [µ (b)− 1] {2 [1− η1 (b)]− η2 (b)}
[1− η1 (b)] {1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]}
+
ρ
1 + α
µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
Under Assumption 4, this last condition is satisfied. A sufficient condition
for uniqueness is εh (b) < εg (b) for all b ∈
(
0, b¯
)
, or equivalently,
εu (c)
b
c (1− γ (b)) + εv (d) >
η1 (b)
1− η1 (b)
[1− γ (b)] [µ (b)− 1]
1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)](
2− η2 (b)
1− η1 (b)
)
+
ρ
1 + α
µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
1− γ (b) + µ (b) [γ (b)− η1 (b)]
1
1− η1 (b)
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the notations of the proof of Proposition 1, we know that g
(
b¯
)
> h
(
b¯
)
and under Assumption 4, g (b) < h (b) for b > 0 but arbitrarily close to 0. Since
b∗ = 1 is a steady state, we have: g (1) = h (1). If the inequality (33) is
satisfied, we have g′ (1) < h′ (1), then by continuity there exist at least two
other steady states, b1 and b2 such that b1 < 1 < b2. The number of steady
states is generically odd.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting Eq. (28) into Eq. (26) and differentiating around the NSS with
respect to bt−1, bt and bt+1, we obtain the following linearization37:[
εv −
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) 11+α
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
]
dbt+1 +
[
1
(1− γ)
εu
c∗
− η1εv + 1
− (1− γ) (µ
∗ − 1) η1
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
(
2− η2
1− η1
)
+
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
−α− ρ+ η1/γ
1 + α
]
dbt
−
[
η1
1− γ
εu
c∗
+
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
η1/γ
1 + α
]
dbt−1 = 0
Lemma 3 follows.
Bifurcation values of εv
εsv is defined by 1− T (εv) +D(εv) = 0:
εsv =
1
c∗ (1− γ) (ε
s
u − εu) ,
where εsu is given by Eq. (42).
εfv is defined by 1 + T (εv) +D(εv) = 0:
εfv =
εu
c∗ (1− γ) +
1− γ
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
[
2
1 + η1
− η1
1 + η1
(µ∗ − 1)
(
2− η2
1− η1
)]
+
2
1 + η1
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
1 + η1/γ − ρ/2
1 + α
εhv is defined by D = 1:
εhv =
1− γ
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) +
µ∗ (γ − η1)2
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
1/γ
1 + α
− η1 εu
c∗ (1− γ)
Critical values of α
αA is defined by ε¯v = 0:
αA ≡ −1− γ + µ
∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ (55)
αB is defined by εfv = ε
h
v :
αB ≡ −
µ∗(γ−η1)
1−γ+µ∗(γ−η1) [1− η1 + (3 + η1) η1/γ]
εu
c∗
(1+η1)
2
1−γ +
1−γ
1−γ+µ∗(γ−η1)
[
1− η1 − η1 (µ∗ − 1)
(
2− η21−η1
)] − 1 (56)
37The arguments of the functions are omitted.
33
Proof of Lemma 4 (ρ = 0)
dεsv
dα
= − 1
(1 + α)
2
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
ρ
1− η1 = 0
dεfv
dα
= − 1
(1 + α)
2
2
1 + η1
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1) (1 + η1/γ − ρ/2)
Lemma 4 follows.
Proof of Lemma 5
dεsv
dρ
=
1
1 + α
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
1
1− η1
dεfv
dρ
= − 1
1 + α
1
1 + η1
µ∗ (γ − η1)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
dεhv
dρ
= 0
Lemma 5 follows.
Critical value of ρ
ρA is defined by εfv = ε
s
v:
ρA ≡ (1 + α)
{
εu
c∗ (1− γ)
1− γ + µ∗ (γ − η1)
µ∗ (γ − η1)
(
1− η21
)
+
1− γ
µ∗ (γ − η1)
[
1− η1 − η1 (µ∗ − 1)
(
2− η2
1− η1
)]
+
(1− η1) (1 + η1/γ)
1 + α
}
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